

**NDOC**

**2025 Mail Interdiction Study**

**High Desert State Prison**

**November 2025**

Joe Lombardo  
Governor

James E. Dzurenda  
Director



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## MEMORANDUM

Date: December 30, 2025

To: Dylan K. Tedford, Deputy General Counsel, Office of Governor Lombardo

From: James E. Dzurenda, Director, Nevada Department of Corrections

Subject: HDSP RaySecur MailSecur Scanner Pilot

In 2024, the Department of Human Services purchased a RaySecur Drug Mail Detection Device utilizing Opioid Settlement funds for the purpose of Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) conducting a one (1) year study at the High Desert State Prison (HDSP). This study was assigned to scan incoming United States Postal Service (USPS) mail that was addressed to offenders within the population at HDSP. The mail scanner was only able to physically scan 20% of the incoming mail due to the vast amount of mail that is sent to that one facility. The drug mail scanning study began 02/05/2025 and was due to end on 02/05/2026. The study was also supposed to identify drug related overdoses, drug related deaths, and overtime resulting from hospital transportation and any other overtime related. Due to the vast amount of evidence, the drug scanner produced related to other tracking data, the study ended immediately on 10/31/2025, to present the finding to take emergency measures to prevent further health destruction and deaths.

Over the past few years, there has been a drastic uptick in the number of overdoses and overdoses that resulted in death. In 2022, there were only 5 documented overdoses. That figure had increased to 22 overdoses in 2023, and more than doubled to 59 overdoses in 2024. In 2025, that 59 increased to 130 by the second week of November. The inability to prevent all K2/Spice from entering the institutions has significantly contributed to the number of overdoses and overdoses that resulted in death within the NDOC facilities. Determining the number of overdoses related to K2/Spice is difficult for two reasons. First, since the synthetic drug substance may be compromised of different chemicals, it is nearly impossible to detect in a person's system. Second, technology to detect the presence of K2/Spice in tainted paper materials did not exist until recently. That said, we know and have known, offenders are using K2/Spice because:

1. They tell us they are using it (cellmates frequently report on each other, etc.);
2. Housing units frequently smell like K2/Spice; and
3. The drug mail scanner pilot at HDSP is positively identifying K2/Spice laced in USPS mail entering the institutions at an alarming rate.

The amount of prison medical transportation and hospital stays consistently increases also at alarming rates which drastically increased Correctional Officer overtime in the NDOC. In June 2025, the average amount of officers on overtime equated to 66.7 officers on overtime each day just for medical transportation and hospital stays. On 11/11/2025, that average already increased to 88.0 officers on overtime every day for this same reason. Those average numbers will continue to increase if operations on how NDOC allows USPS mail into the facilities does not change.

Hospital Census reports (attachment A) show in SFY23, 614 offenders were sent to a local hospital for either inpatient or outpatient care resulting in 3,410.40 days with an average of 5.55 days for each offender. Each of these hospital days requires a minimum of 6 officers on overtime for each 24-hour day for each offender. In SFY25, 970 offenders were sent to a local hospital for either inpatient or outpatient care resulting in 4,922.92 hospital days with an average of 5.08 days for each offender. Each of these days requires a minimum of 6 officers on overtime for each 24-hour day for each offender.

Over the course of the study at HDSP, a RaySecur tracking log (attachment B) was maintained to identify all USPS mail detected with a synthetic drug or narcotic on, in or infused into the USPS mail entering HDSP from 02/05/2025 through 10/30/2025. Over the first six (6) months of the drug mail scanning pilot, 255 scans of USPS mail positively identified that contained a synthetic K2/Spice or controlled substance. Of these scans, 233 were positively identified as K2/Spice. Note that this was only 20% of the USPS mail that was able to be scanned due to the large volume of mail that entered the institution of a regular basis at HDSP and having only one (1) drug mail scanner to utilize. The potential if able to scan every USPS piece of mail would equate to about 1,275 pieces of mail most likely contained K2/Spice or controlled substances at HDSP in those six (6) months. Note that is also taking note that HDSP only incarcerates 28% of NDOC population of 10,589. Thus, it is potentially equating to about 4,500 pieces of USPS mail containing K2/Spice over this six (6) month period that goes undetected without the use of some mail drug scanning technology.

Approaching the end of the study, staff from NDOC's Office of the Inspector General prepared a PowerPoint presentation (attachment C) NDOC showing some synthetic drug cannabinoids, signs of use by offenders, how K2/Spice is utilized once introduced into the facility, what K2/Spice tainted mail looks like, and monetary costs for sale of K2/Spice by those who have obtained it in a facility.

A National Criminal Justice Reference Service briefing (attachment D) identifies how digitization of inmate incoming mail may reduce the introduction of drugs into facilities. It explains how digitizing USPS mail will not eliminate all K2/Spice or drugs coming into the facility but it will eliminate it entering via USPS mail. Other avenues that each agency must target following digitization of mail is smuggling by staff, smuggling by visitors, "throwovers" across perimeter fencing, and drone drops.

RaySecur, the maker of the drug detection scanning device used in this study, created the 2026 Inmate Contraband Field Guide (attachment E) to help Correctional leaders understand the evolving threat of contraband smuggling through inmate mail and identify proven strategies to combat it.

Administrative Regulation AR 750 - Inmate General Correspondence has been updated in draft form as Temporary Emergency AR 750 - Inmate General Correspondence (attachment F). This update will provide clear direction and on how offender mail will be processed to mitigate introduction of contraband into NDOC facilities.

This study provides an exorbitant amount of evidence that shows that the continued introduction of USPS mail into the NDOC facilities without digitizing the mail will not only continue to supply the offender population with avenues for drug use but continue to increase the number of state-wide agency overdoses, overdoses resulting in death, and correctional officer overtime at an alarming rate.



James E. Dzurenda, Director  
Nevada Department of Corrections

**Attachments**

- A – Hospital Census reports
- B – HDSP RaySecur tracking log
- C – NDOC Offender Mail PowerPoint presentation
- D – National Criminal Justice Reference Service briefing
- E – RaySecur 2026 Inmate Contraband Field Guide
- F - Temporary Emergency AR 750 - Inmate General Correspondence (draft)

# ATTACHMENT A



# State of Nevada Department of Corrections

Hospital Census

Between: 07/01/2022 and 06/30/2023

Location	Offenders per Location	Days per Location
BOULDER CITY HOSPITAL	1	0
CARSON TAHOE HOSPITAL	12	45.68
CARSON TAHOE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER	190	726.42
CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL	22	167.08
CHURCHILL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL	1	0
DESERT SPRINGS HOSPITAL	1	.1
GROVER C DILS MEDICAL CENTER	1	0
HOSPICE LOCATION	1	.05
HUMBOLDT GENERAL HOSPITAL	1	.76
LAKES CROSSING	2	114.15
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL	58	445.21
NORTHEASTERN NEVADA REGIONAL HOSPITAL	1	5.07
PERSHING GENERAL HOSPITAL	3	.26
REHABILITATION LOCATION	1	22.88
RENOWN MEDICAL CENTER	32	233.46
RENOWN SOUTH MEADOWS MEDICAL CENTER	3	2.17
SAINT MARY'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER	1	9.31
SIERRA SURGERY HOSPITAL	8	28.78

Offenders per Report: 614

Days per Report: 3410.4

Locations per Report: 25

Report Name: MEDOHC

Run Date: NOV-06-25 08:46 AM

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\*TAP Movements Excluded



**State of Nevada**  
**Department of Corrections**

Hospital Census

Between: 07/01/2022 and 06/30/2023

Location	Offenders per Location	Days per Location
SOUTHERN HILLS HOSPITAL	42	139.26
STEIN FORENSIC HOSPITAL	4	246.06
SUMMERLIN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	1	1.22
SUNRISE HOSPITAL	74	467.01
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER	133	741.06
VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	4	7.14
WILLIAM B RIRIE HOSPITAL	17	7.27

Offenders per Report: 614

Days per Report: 3410.4

Locations per Report: 25

Report Name: MEDOHC

Run Date: NOV-06-25 08:46 AM

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\*TAP Movements Excluded



# State of Nevada Department of Corrections

## Hospital Census

Between: 07/01/2023 and 06/30/2024

Location	Offenders per Location	Days per Location
CARSON TAHOE HOSPITAL	3	6.12
CARSON TAHOE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER	238	1031.1
CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL	27	589.09
LAKES CROSSING	4	225.69
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL	82	391.1
NORTHEASTERN NEVADA REGIONAL HOSPITAL	1	.41
PERSHING GENERAL HOSPITAL	5	2.94
REHABILITATION LOCATION	4	64.29
RENOWN MEDICAL CENTER	56	223.62
RENOWN SOUTH MEADOWS MEDICAL CENTER	3	3.08
SAINT ROSE DOMINICAN HOSPITAL SIENA	2	10.49
SIERRA SURGERY HOSPITAL	2	3.72
SOUTHERN HILLS HOSPITAL	60	245.36
SPRING VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	2	1.76
STEIN FORENSIC HOSPITAL	3	134.26
SUMMERLIN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	1	3.47
SUNRISE HOSPITAL	77	516.8
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER	219	1021.73

Offenders per Report: 806

Days per Report: 4490.4

Locations per Report: 20

Report Name: MEDOHC

Run Date: NOV-06-25 08:50 AM

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\*TAP Movements Excluded



# State of Nevada Department of Corrections

Hospital Census

Between: 07/01/2023 and 06/30/2024

Location	Offenders per Location	Days per Location
VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	4	12.19
WILLIAM B RIRIE HOSPITAL	13	3.18

Offenders per Report: 806

Days per Report: 4490.4

Locations per Report: 20

Report Name: MEDOHC

Run Date: NOV-06-25 08:50 AM

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\*TAP Movements Excluded



# State of Nevada Department of Corrections

## Hospital Census

Between: 07/01/2024 and 06/30/2025

Location	Offenders per Location	Days per Location
CARSON TAHOE HOSPITAL	5	29.77
CARSON TAHOE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER	257	948.87
CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL	30	203.8
HARMON HOSPITAL	1	46.94
HOSPICE LOCATION	4	15.74
LAKES CROSSING	1	224.22
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL	96	710.58
NORTHERN NEVADA MEDICAL CENTER	1	.4
NORTHERN NEVADA SIERRA MEDICAL CENTER	1	1.64
PERSHING GENERAL HOSPITAL	2	.3
REHABILITATION LOCATION	12	438.43
RENOWN MEDICAL CENTER	84	408.94
RENOWN SOUTH MEADOWS MEDICAL CENTER	7	20.62
SAINT MARY'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER	2	5.7
SAINT ROSE DOMINICAN HOSPITAL SIENA	1	42.66
SIERRA SURGERY HOSPITAL	7	21.23
SOUTHERN HILLS HOSPITAL	84	255.01
SPRING VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	2	6.25

Offenders per Report: 970

Days per Report: 4922.92

Locations per Report: 24

Report Name: MEDOHC

Run Date: NOV-06-25 08:51 AM



# State of Nevada Department of Corrections

## Hospital Census

Between: 07/01/2024 and 06/30/2025

Location	Offenders per Location	Days per Location
SUMMERLIN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	1	.94
SUNRISE HOSPITAL	70	300.72
UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER	1	1.96
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER	268	1233.13
VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER	1	0
WILLIAM B RIRIE HOSPITAL	32	5.07

Offenders per Report: 970

Days per Report: 4922.92

Locations per Report: 24

Report Name: MEDOHC

Run Date: NOV-06-25 08:51 AM

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\*TAP Movements Excluded

# ATTACHMENT B

### Raysecur Tracking Log

IR Number	Name & ID Number	Description of Item Scanned	Date
IR-2025-HDSP-000667		White Envelope, revealed hidden Pocket with powder	2/5/2025
IR-2025-HDSP-000664		Legal Mail, paper soaked in potential spice	2/5/2025
IR-2025-HDSP-000664		Legal mail, thick paper soaked in potential spice	2/5/2025
IR-2025-HDSP-000664		Legal mail, thick paper soaked in potential spice	2/5/2025
IR-2025-HDSP-000664		Legal Mail, Hidden pocket with powder	2/5/2025
IR-2025-HDSP-000664		Legal mail, thick paper soaked in potential spice	2/5/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Large Manila Envelope flagged heavily treated paper poss. Spice	2/10/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/11/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Manila Envelope flagged for treated paper inside possible spice	2/12/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Flagged for treated paper, card soaked possible Spice	2/12/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/12/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card size envelope flagged for treated paper, and staining	2/12/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/14/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/14/2025
IR-2025-HDSP-000843		Envelope Flagged and turned out to contain unknown powder	2/14/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/18/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/18/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Card Size Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/18/2025
IR-2025-HDSP-000935		Envelope Flagged, Hidden pocket containing Crystals/Powder	2/19/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/19/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/19/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/19/2025
Sent To Cert for Eval		Envelope Flagged for Treated Paper, potential spice	2/19/2025



Raysecur Tracking Log

IR Number	Name & ID Number	Description of Item Scanned	Date
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	3/31/2025
R2025HDSP001669		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/25/2025
R2025HDSP001688		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/25/2025
R2025HDSP001690		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/25/2025
R2025HDSP001691		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/26/2025
R2025HDSP001691		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/26/2025
R2025HDSP001691		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/26/2025
R2025HDSP001691		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/26/2025
R2025HDSP001691		Potential Legal Mail Flagged for Treated Paper	3/26/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/4/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/4/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/4/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/4/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/4/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/4/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/4/2025
R2025HDSP001990		Potential Legal Mail Containing Cell Phone	4/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		4xManilla Envelopes flagged for treated/ poss spice	4/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		2x Envelopes flagged for treated/poss spice	4/10/2025
IR2025HDSP00206		3 Envelopes w/ unknown substance under stamps	4/10/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/14/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/14/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/14/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	4/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/16/2025
R2025HDSP002174		Envelope with unknown substance under stamp	4/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope with unknown substance under stamp	4/17/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	4/17/2025

Raysecur Tracking Log

IR Number	Name & ID Number	Description of Item Scanned	Date
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	4/17/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	4/17/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope with unknown substance under stamp	4/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope with unknown substance under stamp	4/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	4/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	4/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	4/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	4/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/1/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/1/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/1/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/1/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/1/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	5/1/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/6/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/6/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	5/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/9/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/13/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged for treated potential spice	5/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Envelope flagged for treated paper potential spice	5/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	5/16/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Card Envelope flagged, pictures treated	5/22/2025
IR Number	Name & ID Number	Description of Item Scanned	Date







Raysecur Tracking Log

UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice, mailed 9/3/2025	8/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice, Mailed 9/3/25	8/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Card Szd Letter Flgd for Trtd/Poss Spice Mailed 9/9/25	8/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	8/22/2025
IR2025HDSP00507	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/22/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/25/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/25/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Large Make Shift Envelope Flagged Poss Spice/Treated	8/26/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Large Envelope Flagged for Poss Spice/Treated Paper	8/26/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	8/28/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/2/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Medium Sized Letter Treated/Stained/ Poss Spice	9/2/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Medium Sized Letter Treated/Stained/ Poss Spice	9/2/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	2 Hand Made Envelopes Flgd for Treated/Stained	9/2/2025
IR2025HDSP00545	2 Envelopes containing wax smells of weed	9/2/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Card Sized Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Large Cardboard Envelope Flgd for Treated/Poss Spice	9/5/2025
GRIEVANCE	Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	9/5/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	9/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	3 X Manilla Envelopes FLgd for Treated/Poss Spice	9/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Manilla Envelope Flagged for treated/PossSpice	9/8/2025
IR2025HDSP00552	Newspapers Covered unknown substance	9/9/2025
IR2025HDSP00551	Letter Flagged/Paper covered in powder	9/9/2025
Sent Back 9/23/25	2 Letters Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/10/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/11/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/19/3035
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/19/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Letter Flagged for Treated/Poss Spice	9/26/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Flagged in mailroom scanner	9/30/2025
Sent Back 10/8/25	Flagged in mailroom scanner	9/30/2025
Sent Back 10/8/25	Flagged in mailroom scanner	9/30/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Flagged in mailroom scanner	9/30/2025
UA Wait for Decs.	Flagged in mailroom scanner	9/30/2025

Raysecur Tracking Log

UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	9/30/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/7/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/7/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner (x3)	10/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/8/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/10/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner (x5)	10/10/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner (x2)	10/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/15/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/23/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/30/2025
UA Wait for Decs.		Flagged in mailroom scanner	10/30/2025

# ATTACHMENT C

# Nevada Department of Corrections

## Offender Mail

November 13, 2025



Joe Lombardo  
*Governor*

James Dzurenda  
*Director*

1

### **Mission**

The Nevada Department of Corrections will improve public safety by ensuring a safe and humane environment that incorporates proven rehabilitation initiatives that prepare individuals for successful reintegration into our communities.



2

# Offender Mail

## Overview:

**NRS 209.42303 Institution or facility required to provide offender with access to certain mail; procedure for exemption from requirement.**

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an institution or facility shall provide an offender with the original, physical copy of any mail addressed to the offender that the offender is entitled and allowed to receive.

By requiring all original mail to be provided to offenders we are providing them with illicit substances such as K2/Spice.

K2/Spice is difficult or near impossible to detect and the effects on the user of K2/Spice can be extremely hazardous and even fatal.

NDOC Overdoses		
Year	Incidents	Deaths
2015	4	1
2016	6	1
2017	5	1
2018	3	0
2019	3	1
2020	14	0
2021	12	0
2022	5	2
2023	22	1
2024	59	1
2025 (YTD)	146	9



# What is Spice?


K2- MANDOWN - SPIG - DIABLO - GERB - BLISS

- The term "Spice" was traditionally used to describe dried plant material laced with Synthetic Cannabinoids.
- Since Synthetic Cannabinoids hit the market in the early 2000s, it has risen in popularity due to its ability to defeat drug screening.
- "Spice" has since evolved in the prison system as a term used for paper products saturated in various chemical compounds. These compounds usually consist of Synthetic Cannabinoids, Cathinones (Bath salts), Synthetic Opioids (Fentanyl, W18), Raid Wasp Spray, and Algae Eater (Fish Aquarium Chemicals).



Buy 4-2 Powder  
 Original: \$2.25.00  
 Special: \$2.02.50

500 pages strongest #2 paper book  
 Original: \$9.000.00  
 Special: \$8.100.00



1000 pages liquid-infused #2 paper  
 Original: \$139.00  
 Special: \$125.10

4-2 liquid-infused paper  
 Original: \$135.00  
 Special: \$121.50



## Signs of Use

- Death
- Increased heartbeat
- Heart attack
- Kidney failure
- Altered perception
- Poor coordination
- Bloodshot eyes
- Nausea/Vomiting
- Confusion/Dizziness
- Changes in appetite
- Stroke
- Seizures
- Paranoia
- Anxiety
- Depression
- Delusions or hallucinations
- Mood swings or agitation
- Muscle death
- Psychosis
- Suicidal tendencies
- Outbursts of rage/violent behavior
- Disordered thought processes
- Lack of interest in hobbies
- Distancing from family and friends



5

## Current Detection Methods

- Visual
- Touch (**potential for exposure**)
- Drug Detection Testing Kits
- Light Table




 DETECTACHEM

### THE PROBLEMS

- There are an estimated 250–300 distinct synthetic cannabinoid compounds, many of which may evade standard testing protocols.
- Time Consuming
- Potential Exposures
- Everchanging Methods To Conceal
- Different Chemicals Used

USA, Bug Spray, Animal Chemical Products, Floor Cleaning Agents



6

## K2/Spice inside the Institutions



7

## How does it get into the Institutions?

- Correspondence (regular mail/legal mail)
- Offender transfers
- Visiting w/family and friends
- Contraband drops
- Correctional staff
- Unintentional transmission through legal/professional meetings




8

## How does it get into the Institutions?



Children's Drawings



REGULAR CORRESPONDENCE



LEGAL MAIL

Offenders most commonly exploit the mail system to introduce mail laced with Intoxicants.



9


## Saturated Paper Products

### Identifying Altered Paper Products:

- Waxy/Film-like saturation
  - May appear off-colored
  - Can be analytically lab-tested
  - Can be tested using narcotics testing kits.
  - May have a sweet aroma
- \*Do Not purposely attempt to smell the suspected spice\**

### Paper Product Examples:


- A4 Copying Paper
- Cardstock
- Greeting Cards
- Legal Documents
- Books



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## Use, Sales and/or Distribution

- Offenders will cut the saturated paper into shapes for use, sales, and/or distribution. (Examples Below)
- Offenders will use the terms: Full Sheet, Half Sheet, I.D., Stamp, Stick, and Hit to communicate the size of "spice" for use, sales, and/or distribution.



Disclaimer: Prices may vary depending on potency, supply, and institutional demand




11

## Current Financial Trends Within Correctional Institutions

- Due to advances in technology, offenders are increasingly using electronic funds transfer (EFT) apps to send and receive money.
- This trend presents significant challenges for institutions attempting to track offender financial activity and transactions, as many of these platforms lack transparency or are not integrated with institutional monitoring systems.



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## Drug Scanner Pilot @ High Desert State Prison Feb to Oct 2025

RaySecur MailSecur scanner purchased with Opioid Reduction Funding support from the State of Nevada Department of Health and Human Services.

Utilizing terahertz radiation (t-ray), scanner can identify explosives, illicit items, contraband, powders, liquids, chemicals, biological, radiological, and nuclear substances within the mail item being scanned.

6-month assessment showed 233 interceptions of K2/Spice, 22 interceptions of other controlled substances, and 5 interceptions of other contraband items including cellular phones.

Mail received	400-600/day
Mail scanned	65-130/day
Regular mail scanned	50-100/day
Legal mail scanned	15-30/day
Incident Reports/referral to Inspector General	24
Deaths contributed to overdose at HDSP	3
Deaths contributed to overdose statewide	12
HDSP Staff exposure/needing medical treatment	0



**Roughly 78-84% of incoming mail was not able to be scanned**

<https://nypost.com/2025/08/27/us-news/accused-vegas-drug-smuggler-busted-for-sending-fentanyl-laced-letters-to-prisons/>

## Accused Vegas drug smuggler busted for sending fentanyl-laced letters to prisons in Nevada, California

By

[Jared Downing](#)

Published Aug. 27, 2025, 6:40 p.m. ET



An alleged drug smuggler who sent letters on fentanyl-laced paper to prisons across Nevada and California — leading to at least one death — was busted by Las Vegas cops.

Hoza Del Collins, 30, allegedly advertised his mail-order dope business on social media, according to a police report [obtained by CBS 8](#). He was also caught on surveillance video sending the illicit letters through the mail, the report said.

Collins had allegedly been running his scheme from as far back as last September, and at least one inmate died from the fentanyl he supplied — landing Collins with a second-degree murder charge.

Michael Trapper, the dead inmate from Ely State Prison in Nevada, allegedly snorted white powder he had scraped from legal documents he received in the mail.

Prison officials tracked 278 phone calls between inmates at six different facilities, which authorities say demonstrated “the scope and consistency of this conspiracy,” according to the aforementioned report.



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Questions?



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# ATTACHMENT D

**The author(s) shown below used Federal funding provided by the U.S. Department of Justice to prepare the following resource:**

**Document Title:** Mitigating Contraband via the Mail: An Overview of Approaches for Managing the Introduction of Drug Contraband through the Digitization of Inmate Mail

**Author(s):** J. Russo, M. Planty, J. Shaffer, M.N. Parsons, J.D. Roper-Miller

**Document Number:** 302140

**Date Received:** September 2021

**Award Number:** 2018-75-CX-K003

**This resource has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. This resource is being made publicly available through the Office of Justice Programs' National Criminal Justice Reference Service.**

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# Mitigating Contraband

## via the Mail

### An overview of approaches for managing the introduction of drug contraband through the digitization of inmate mail

This brief is part of a series of documents that focuses on contraband in correctional facilities and specifically focuses on the digitization of incoming inmate mail to counter the introduction of contraband drugs. The goal of [this series](#) is to offer foundational insights from use cases, highlight challenges of contraband detection, compare illustrative products, and discuss the future of contraband detection and management.

## Key Takeaways

- Digitization of inmates' incoming personal mail may reduce the introduction of drugs into facilities by diverting items to an offsite mail-processing vendor, who converts it to a digital form and transmits the documents to correctional facilities for distribution to inmates via tablets or kiosks.
- Implementing a digitized mail solution may be most efficiently deployed as part of a bundled approach with other inmate services such as telephone, messaging, video-visitation, and electronic books, supported by kiosks or tablets. In most cases, the digitized mail services can be provided at no cost to the agency as part of a comprehensive inmate services platform.
- The shutdown of the mailroom pipeline will not reduce inmate demand for drugs; therefore, pressure on other common contraband pathways (e.g., smuggling by staff and visitors, "throw-overs," or drone drops) could increase.

Detecting drug contraband entering correctional facilities via the mail is challenging because drugs can be sprayed onto paper, incorporated into ink, hidden under stamps, and inconspicuously concealed within a piece of correspondence. The methods used to hide the drugs, coupled with the sheer volume of mail received daily, make it difficult to detect all drugs through physical screening. Undetected drugs that are delivered to inmates pose significant health and safety concerns, including overdose and death. To mitigate the flow of drugs through mail, some correctional facilities are employing solutions that replace physical mail with electronic communication or reproductions of originals. This approach appears to be part of a progression toward using technology to deliver services to incarcerated people and is in line with societal trends with respect to interpersonal communication.

## Contraband Interdiction Solutions for Correctional Facilities

This document focuses on the digitization of inmate mail. Additional documents in this series address specific contraband topics.



**Figure 1:** The digitization of inmate mail can be an effective strategy to stem the flow of drugs into correctional facilities.



## Drugs entering correctional facilities compromise safety and well-being.


Contraband drugs can undermine the safety and security of a correctional facility in a variety of ways. For example, the drug trade is a lucrative criminal enterprise, and inmate gangs often use violence to protect their interests. Staff can be manipulated into bringing drugs into a facility and, once compromised, can be forced to participate in other nefarious activities on behalf of inmates. The availability of drugs undermines a facility's rehabilitative efforts in support of inmates who desire to overcome addiction. Inmates under the influence of drugs may become violent toward staff or other inmates. Further, evidence suggests that some newer forms of contraband drugs (e.g., synthetic cannabinoids, fentanyl, and fentanyl compounds) are becoming more prevalent and more dangerous; subsequently instances of inmate overdoses and deaths are on the rise.<sup>1,2</sup>

The health of correctional staff is also directly impacted by these dangerous drugs. Reports of staff falling ill following incidents in which they have accidentally inhaled second-hand smoke from inmate use of synthetic cannabinoids or encountered fentanyl while conducting a search have been noted in several U.S. correctional facilities.<sup>3,4</sup> Concerns regarding life-threatening risks associated with passive or incidental exposure have been documented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.<sup>5</sup> However, there are no known cases in which staff have experienced lasting effects after exposure, and there is some debate about whether some victims may suffer from psychosomatic symptoms related to fear and anxiety when they simply think they may have been exposed. Regardless of the likelihood of serious harm, staff are personally affected, and incidents can have critical consequences for the facility in the form of lockdowns, hazardous material cleanups, and reduced staff availability due to illness.


## Inconspicuous drug contraband enters via the mailroom.

Although contraband drugs are introduced into an institution through several pathways, one primary entry point is the mailroom. Screening mail for drugs is challenging because of the high volume of mail, small quantities of drugs trafficked, and ease of concealment. The ability to embed or infuse chemical substances into mail items has resulted in the increased prevalence of drugs such as synthetic cannabinoids, fentanyl, and Suboxone in correctional facilities. As seen in **Figure 2** and **Figure 3**, synthetic drugs can be cleverly hidden or integrated into seemingly innocuous materials, such as handwritten letters and books. The growing threat of contraband drugs entering via the mailroom has prompted several correctional agencies in the United States to consider digitized inmate mail processing solutions, which have both benefits and potential negative implications.

1. Tennyson, K. M., Ray, C. S., & Maass, K. T. (2021, January). *Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues: Federal trends and trafficking patterns*. Retrieved from [https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2021/20210125\\_Fentanyl-Report.pdf](https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2021/20210125_Fentanyl-Report.pdf)
2. Carson, E. A. (2020) *Mortality in state and federal prisons, 2001-2016 – statistical tables*. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved from <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msfp0116st.pdf>
3. Kalinowski, B. (2021, March). *Two SCI-Dallas officers sickened by drug-laced mail*. Retrieved from [https://www.citizenvoice.com/news/doc-two-sci-dallas-officers-sickened-by-drug-laced-mail/article\\_4acfb95a-81e5-52fb-b927-540fb12089eb.html](https://www.citizenvoice.com/news/doc-two-sci-dallas-officers-sickened-by-drug-laced-mail/article_4acfb95a-81e5-52fb-b927-540fb12089eb.html)
4. Esack, S. (2018, August). *Pennsylvania orders lockdown of all state prisons, cites sickness from smuggled chemical drugs*. Retrieved from <https://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-nws-pennsylvania-state-prisons-lockdown-20180829-story.html>
5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2020) *Preventing emergency responders' exposures to illicit drugs*. Retrieved from <https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/fentanyl/tjsk.html>



**Figure 2:** This letter, discovered by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PA DOC), tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids. The photo paper was disguised as notebook paper with handwritten lines saturated with drug faced ink.




**Figure 3:** A package containing books was mailed to an inmate; upon inspection, 57 strips of Suboxone were discovered hidden within a Bible.

## Digitized mail can mitigate risk of drug introduction into a facility.

Digitization of incoming inmate personal mail (legal mail is discussed below) may serve as a tool in combating the contraband drug problem. Under the most current prevalent implementation model, inmates' friends and family are instructed to send personal mail not to a correctional facility, but to a contracted vendor at an outside location. The vendor receives the mail and screens items for compliance with facility regulations. Authorized items (i.e., letters, greeting cards, photos, envelopes) are then electronically scanned and uploaded to the vendor's information system platform. The original documents are typically stored for a period of time (dependent on the using agency's records retention/retrieval schedule) before they are destroyed.

Institution staff have access to the platform to download mail items. In specific scenarios, the platform may be programmed to automatically screen for keywords indicative of security or inmate mental health concerns. Items flagged as potential concerns can be reviewed by security staff or healthcare professionals to facilitate the appropriate response. Ultimately, mail is made accessible to the inmate via tablets or kiosks. The most efficient and effective implementation model uses a single vendor (or partners) to provide the offsite mail processing and digitization platform as well as the kiosk/tablet and e-messaging as a bundled end-to-end service under one contract. The process of digitizing mail can be viewed in **Figure 4**. Several correctional facilities have employed this model. For example, Shawnee County, Kansas, has implemented a digitized mail solution to combat the influx of drugs entering the jail system. Shawnee County established the process for the facility's 500+ inmate population, which provides offsite scanning of mail and subsequent access to the scanned images through tablets or designated kiosks.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Hrenchic, T. (2020, February). To guard against drugs, county digitizes jail mail. *The Topeka Capital Journal*. Retrieved from <https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/To-Guard-Against-Drugs-County-Digitizes-Jail-Mail.html>



**Figure 4:** A digitized mail solution scans incoming mail, typically in an offsite facility, and uploads the image for inmate electronic viewing — effectively eliminating the introduction of drugs into a correctional facility via personal mail.

The implementation of a digitized mail system becomes cumbersome, if not impossible, in cases in which one vendor is contracted to handle the physical mail process but another controls the networks and devices necessary to electronically transmit the items to inmates. Therefore, agencies interested in this model must consider existing contracts that could introduce problems with procurement and logistics that may create inefficiencies if multiple systems are required that do not integrate seamlessly.

The positive impact of a digitized inmate mail system on the contraband drug problem may be evident through decreases in the number of drug finds, positive drug tests, and inmate overdoses. An effective digitized inmate mail system may reduce drug-related events, including a decrease in the incidence rate of inmate-on-inmate assaults, inmate-on-staff assaults, inmate and staff trips to an outside emergency room, and deaths.

The model described above provides an elegant way to eliminate the introduction of drugs via incoming inmate mail. This is not the only way to manage inmate personal mail; other variations include systems in which:

- Friends/families can send digital mail through the following methods:
  1. Electronic communication received by a vendor is printed and mailed to the facility for distribution.
  2. Electronic communication is delivered, through a vendor, to a kiosk in a facility mailroom where it is printed and distributed to the inmate.
  3. Electronic communication is sent directly to inmates and is viewed electronically on tablets/kiosks.
- Vendors receive and process inmate mail offsite; however, the items are downloaded by facility mailroom staff who then print copies of the items for distribution to the inmates.
- Facilities still receive incoming mail as normal but now photocopy the items and provide the copies to inmates.



## Limitations of Digitized Mail Programs

For a correctional agency to adopt a digitized mail system and leverage the technology as a potentially efficient and effective solution, multiple limitations must be addressed before implementing such a system:


1. Review existing contracts with incumbent vendors, including clauses that may prohibit shared use of the incumbent's network infrastructure or the installation and operation of a separate, parallel network.
2. Consider local, state, and federal privacy regulations specific to third-party access and control over inmate personal mail, as well as potential issues regarding the digitization and destruction of original documents and personal property.
3. Recognize the potential negative impact that digitizing personal inmate letters and photos may have on maintaining inmate wellness and connectedness to family, friends, and outside parties. Because of this benefit, the restriction of physical mail has been challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union, which claims banning incoming mail violates inmates' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.<sup>7</sup>

## Future of Mail Contraband Prevention

Digitizing inmate mail appears to be part of a natural progression toward the greater use of technology to deliver a variety of services to those incarcerated and is in line with societal trends with respect to interpersonal communication. Further, a digitized inmate mail system appears to be a critical aspect of a modern, multilayered security approach to address the contraband drug problem in correctional institutions and contribute to the momentum of the correctional capability to combat synthetic drugs. When implemented as part of a bundled inmate communications platform and coordinated to take advantage of the need for fewer mailroom staff, digitized mail can be cost-efficient.

### Contraband in Legal Correspondence

Although this brief focuses on incoming inmate personal mail, legal mail is also a pathway for contraband drugs, as seen in **Figure 5**. Unlike personal mail, legal mail is protected by attorney-client privilege. Staff may open privileged mail to check for contraband but only in the presence of the inmate; thus, some of the solutions discussed above may not be acceptable in all jurisdictions. That said, the technology exists to securely transmit legal documents between parties (i.e., attorney and inmate); therefore, digitizing this type of mail could be explored. Agencies should consider potential legal challenges and coordinate with stakeholders (e.g., advocacy groups, courts, district attorneys, public defenders) to identify and address concerns prior to implementation.



**Figure 5:** Legal documents discovered by the PA DOC containing liquified Suboxone.

<sup>7</sup> ACLU. (2015, December). *ACLU of NH challenges state prison ban on mailed Christmas cards, prayer cards, and children's drawings*. Retrieved from <https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-nh-challenges-state-prison-ban-mailed-christmas-cards-prayer-cards-and-childrens>



## Key Considerations for Leaders in the Corrections Community

1. While a digitized incoming inmate mail solution can eliminate vulnerabilities associated with traditional mail, it is not a panacea. The demand for drugs is not altered, and inmates and their conspirators will seek to exploit other contraband pathways (e.g., visitors, staff, drones, throw-overs). Agencies should focus resources on each pathway with equal rigor such that management of contraband is part of a holistic strategy.
2. A key benefit of a digitized mail solution is the potential cost savings associated with reductions in mailroom staffing. In agencies with mailroom employees who are represented by a union, it will be necessary to negotiate for downsizing or reallocation of staff in advance so that cost savings can be realized as soon as possible after deployment.
3. Agencies should coordinate with stakeholders (e.g., advocacy groups, courts, district attorneys, public defenders) to identify and address concerns prior to implementation, particularly for legal correspondence.
4. Agencies should consider the ancillary benefits of a fully digitized mail solution beyond stemming the flow of drugs via the mailroom. For example, written communications can be automatically scanned for keywords indicative of security issues or inmate mental health concerns. In addition, the elimination of physical mail items can reduce excessive clutter in cells, which can reduce the fire load and allow for officers to conduct more efficient cell searches.

Published: May 2021

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<https://cjtec.org/>

# ATTACHMENT E

RAYSECUR<sup>®</sup>

# 2026 INMATE CONTRABAND FIELD GUIDE

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This field guide is designed to help corrections leaders understand the evolving threat of contraband smuggling through inmate mail and identify proven strategies to combat it.

Despite being perceived as tightly controlled environments, nearly every prison, jail, and correctional facility in the U.S. continues to face a rising influx of illicit drugs and contraband smuggled through inmate mail. The problem is accelerating in 2025 due to high financial incentives, widespread substance use disorders among incarcerated individuals, and continued staffing and resource shortages across the corrections system.

Traditional mail-screening methods are no longer effective against evolving concealment techniques. Paper-based contraband—soaked in drugs or illicit substances like K2, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and even household chemicals—can pass undetected through visual checks, manual inspections, and X-ray systems. Legal protections surrounding inmate correspondence, especially legal mail, further complicate inspection and limit intervention.

Household chemicals are an emerging and overlooked threat. Insecticides, cleaning solvents, embalming fluid, adhesives, and even bodily fluids are now being used to treat mail and paper. Certain aerosol insecticides—such as the commonly used green-can formulations—are preferred because they can be absorbed into paper, leaving little visible trace and evading traditional screening and identification tools. These substances are toxic, hard to detect, and can compromise both staff safety and imaging accuracy.

Because they mimic harmless materials and don't appear on density-based scans, facilities must adopt updated SOPs, enhanced operator training, and layered detection methods that can reveal chemically treated paper without breaching legal mail protections.



**The result: wasted resources, overwhelmed staff, and dangerous conditions for officers, mailroom personnel, and the incarcerated population. This white paper explores the modern challenges of mail-based smuggling, explains why legacy screening methods fall short, and introduces 4D T-ray imaging technology as a powerful, privacy-preserving solution to this growing crisis.**



### SOURCES

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Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Hospital Cost Data (2024)  
Department of Justice, Wrongful Death Civil Case Filings Summary (2022-2024)  
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook and Turnover in Public Safety Roles (2025)

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## KEY STATISTICS

**▲ 600%**

increase in inmate drug-  
and alcohol-related  
deaths since 2010\*

**55-60%**

staffing shortages for  
corrections officers in  
some states

**\$14,000+**

average hospital  
cost per overdose-  
related incident

**\$1M+**


average settlement in  
wrongful death lawsuits  
related to in-custody  
overdoses

**~50%**

annual staff turnover  
rate in many  
correctional facilities

## A CRITICAL SITUATION... THAT'S ONLY GETTING WORSE

Jails, prisons, detention centers, and other correctional facilities are designed to be secure environments. Yet dangerous substances—including drugs, weapons, and other contraband—continue to enter these institutions at an alarming rate.



Among the most common and difficult-to-control smuggling methods in 2025 remains inmate mail: the letters, greeting cards, magazines, and small packages received from family, friends, or legal representatives.

Volume alone isn't the only issue. Ongoing budget constraints, staffing shortages, and increasingly sophisticated smuggling tactics have created a perfect storm<sup>1</sup>. Smugglers continue to evolve their methods—exploiting outdated inspection tools and blind spots in current screening procedures.

The range of contraband entering facilities is growing. Suboxone strips, used in opioid treatment, are commonly concealed beneath stamps or return address labels. Synthetic drugs like K2, embalming fluid, and even bug spray are soaked into paper, making them appear completely ordinary<sup>2</sup>. Criminal conspirators also send cell phones, SIM cards, USB drives, blades, and needles—enabling illicit communication and presenting serious safety risks<sup>3</sup>.

1 National Institute of Corrections, Mailroom Operations & Contraband Trends in Corrections, 2023-2025  
 2 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Correctional Workforce and Staffing Data, 2025  
 3 State DOC reports on contraband seizures and mail screening protocols (2023-2025)

With many states now reporting corrections officer vacancy rates exceeding 50% and mail volumes remaining high, 2025 has underscored the urgent need for scalable, modern screening solutions that protect both staff and inmates while respecting legal mail protections.

## WHY IS THIS STILL HAPPENING?

A nationwide shortage of correctional officers is compounding the contraband crisis. Across the U.S., prisons and jails are operating with severe staffing gaps—many with vacancy rates exceeding 25–40%. In states like New York, Georgia, and North Carolina, hundreds of officer posts remain unfilled, forcing existing staff to work mandatory overtime and leaving critical functions—such as mail screening—understaffed or inconsistently performed.

This shortage reduces the time and attention available for thorough mail inspections, while burnout and turnover further erode institutional knowledge. The result is a system stretched too thin to keep pace with evolving smuggling tactics.

Mail remains one of the most common and effective methods for introducing contraband into correctional facilities. According to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, inmate mail is the second leading avenue for drug smuggling, surpassed only by intake or booking areas. The low risk and high reward of mail-based smuggling make it an enduring channel for both external accomplices and incarcerated individuals.

At the same time, the public health crisis behind bars drives unrelenting demand. Roughly 65% of the U.S. prison population has an active substance use disorder (SUD), and another 20% were under the influence at the time of their offense. Yet access to evidence-based treatment remains minimal: the National Academy of Sciences found that only 5% of incarcerated individuals with opioid use disorder receive medication-assisted treatment (MAT). Most facilities still rely on detox or counseling-only models—leaving many inmates vulnerable to relapse and dependent on black-market sources to manage withdrawal or maintain addiction.

Together, these forces—staffing shortages, insufficient treatment access, and evolving concealment methods—create the conditions for a perfect storm: overwhelmed officers, overburdened systems, and a resilient contraband supply chain that continues to exploit the gaps.



Smugglers have become increasingly sophisticated, using the mail not as a fallback, but as a primary delivery system. Traditional concealment techniques have been replaced by chemical innovation. Instead of hiding contraband inside hollowed-out objects, perpetrators now treat ordinary paper with powerful substances—including **synthetic cannabinoids (like K2 and Spice), embalming fluid, and even insecticides such as bug spray**. Once dried, the paper looks and feels like a normal letter, making it nearly impossible to detect through visual inspection or manual screening.



To make matters worse, these substances are intentionally altered to avoid detection. Because synthetic compounds can be easily reformulated, they can often slip past drug analyzers and field test kits—even when the testing equipment is up to date. This ongoing game of chemical cat-and-mouse allows traffickers to stay one step ahead, evading detection and continuing to profit from smuggling operations.

Without modern mail screening tools that go beyond surface-level inspection, facilities remain vulnerable. And with so much to gain—and seemingly little to lose—bad actors will continue exploiting the mail system as a major gateway for drugs and contraband.

## THE FRONT LINES OF MAIL THREATS: REAL INCIDENTS, REAL CONSEQUENCES

Mail screening is no longer a back-office task. In correctional facilities across the country, it has become one of the most dangerous and high stakes duties performed by staff. A growing number of incidents prove what many in the field already know: the mailroom is now a critical vector for dangerous drug exposure—and officers are paying the price.

### THE THREAT IS REAL—AND RISING

Drugs like fentanyl and synthetic cannabinoids (K2/Spice) are being smuggled into facilities in increasingly deceptive ways—often through legal mail, where protections against tampering make thorough screening more difficult. These substances are so potent that even trace exposure can cause serious health effects or death. Recent incidents illustrate how quickly and violently these exposures can occur:

**Thomson Federal Prison (IL), April 2025:** Fifteen corrections officers were hospitalized after exposure to an unknown substance while processing mail. It was the eighth such incident at the facility in just over a year. Union officials called the situation “a ticking time bomb.”

**USP Atwater (CA), August 2024:** A mailroom supervisor died after handling an envelope laced with fentanyl, amphetamines, and synthetic cannabinoids disguised as legal mail. A second officer was hospitalized but survived. Three individuals have since been federally charged in connection with the attack.

**Santa Rita Jail (CA), 2024–2025:** Over 100 pieces of incoming mail, many labeled as attorney correspondence, were found to contain synthetic drugs soaked into the paper. Mailroom staff now intercept drug-soaked mail up to three times per week.

**Oklahoma DOC has documented 118 cases of “soaked” mail since 2022,** illustrating how widespread and persistent these tactics have become.

**Oneida County, NY, 2024:** Officers in two state prisons were hospitalized after routine mail handling led to fentanyl exposure. The facilities were later cited by the Department of Labor for failure to provide adequate personal protective equipment (PPE).

Nationwide reporting confirms the scale of the threat: in 2024, **44% of mail contraband incidents involved illegal drugs**, with letters proving more problematic than packages (Corrections1). At the state level, corrections leaders echo these challenges.

**These incidents are not isolated—they are systemic.**


The volume, potency, and delivery methods of contraband are evolving faster than most facility protocols can adapt.

And without proper tools and safeguards in place, the consequences are becoming more frequent—and more severe.

## THE STAKES FOR STAFF ARE HIGHER THAN EVER

All of this is unfolding during a time of unprecedented staffing challenges:

- Some facilities are experiencing up to 70% staffing shortages.
- Annual turnover for correctional officers in certain regions exceeds 55%.
- Officers are asked to do more with fewer resources—and under far more dangerous conditions.



### SOURCES

San Francisco Chronicle, "Drugs are being smuggled into Bay Area jails in a bizarre new way," April 2024  
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## CONVENTIONAL SCREENING APPROACHES CAN'T KEEP PACE WITH MODERN MAIL THREATS

Despite years of awareness, mail-based contraband remains a persistent—and growing—problem in correctional facilities. Why? Most legacy screening tools simply weren't built to handle the evolving tactics used by those smuggling narcotics and dangerous contraband into secure environments.

While traditional screening methods can be helpful in specific scenarios, none offer comprehensive protection against today's most common threats—particularly those involving synthetic drugs, chemically treated paper, or cleverly concealed items. The result: a false sense of security that leaves staff exposed and facilities vulnerable.

Below are the most common screening approaches still in use—and the critical reasons they fall short in 2025:

### ▲ TACTILE (MANUAL) INSPECTIONS

Manual screening is still widely used, with staff opening and physically inspecting mail. This approach places personnel at direct risk—especially with the rise of synthetic drugs like fentanyl that can cause severe harm from accidental exposure. Worse, mail is increasingly treated with drugs in ways that make it visually and texturally indistinguishable from ordinary paper, rendering manual checks ineffective.

### ▲ PHOTOCOPYING OR DIGITIZING MAIL

Digitization is often seen as a safer, more scalable approach, but it brings its own challenges. In-house or third-party teams must still handle and open mail, facing exposure risks before scanning occurs. The practice also delays delivery and raises legal and ethical concerns, particularly with original mail like handwritten letters or legal correspondence.

### ▲ X-RAY SCREENING

X-ray systems can detect large, dense objects—like weapons or metallic items—but they are not sensitive enough to detect threats commonly found in inmate mail: powders, liquids, gels, and drug-soaked paper. According to the UK's PAS 97 standard, white powder can be present in sufficiently small quantities and be undetectable by typical X-ray-based screening processes, and image interpretation requires specialized training and certification. Licensing, shielding, and infrastructure requirements add further complexity and cost.

### ▲ LIGHTBOXES

Lightboxes are essentially backlit panels, similar to the tools artists use to trace drawings. They can illuminate the outline of an envelope or a few thin sheets of paper, but they do not allow inspection inside the item. Their use in corrections mailrooms is extremely limited: they cannot penetrate beyond a few sheets, and they provide no visibility into powders, liquids, gels, or drug-soaked paper.

At best, lightboxes can reveal obvious physical concealment in a very small subset of mail items. But as contraband methods evolve, this tool offers little meaningful protection. With growing mail volume and persistent staffing shortages, lightboxes are too limited in scope and practicality to serve as a viable mail-screening solution.

### ▲ CANINE UNITS

Well-trained dogs can detect specific narcotics or explosives—but they are not infallible. Because canines are trained on a limited set of substances, evolving synthetics like K2/K3 and common household chemicals often slip past them, making these compounds popular among smugglers. Chemical masking techniques can further prevent detection, and canine exposure to fentanyl can be fatal. On top of that, maintaining effective units is costly, requiring ongoing training and high operational investment—often out of reach for facilities operating on tight budgets.

### ▲ FIELD TEST KITS

Colorimetric tests, swipe cards, and other field test kits can provide a rapid indication of specific narcotics. However, these kits are only as strong as the library of compounds they are trained to detect. With constantly evolving synthetics like K2 and fentanyl analogues, many substances fall outside their detection range. Importantly, they generally require direct access to the page or contents of the mail item—forcing staff to handle potentially dangerous contraband directly. Best practice is to use field kits as a secondary identification step after an anomaly has already been detected by another tool. Unfortunately, in many facilities, field tests are misused as a first line screening method, placing personnel at unnecessary risk and creating a false sense of security.

### ▲ BULK AND TRACE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS

Portable narcotics analyzers, including Raman and FTIR spectrometers, can offer highly accurate identification of known substances—but only within the parameters of their pre-loaded libraries. New or altered compounds often go undetected. Like field kits, these analyzers require direct sampling of the suspicious material, meaning the mail must already be opened, exposing the staff to the threat. They are best suited as confirmatory tools once a suspicious item has been isolated, not as primary screening systems. In practice, however, they are often deployed prematurely as frontline detectors, leading to both safety concerns and wasted resources when facilities rely on them to compensate for outdated mail-screening processes.

## **BOTTOM LINE**

**In 2025, Conventional methods will no longer be enough. The threat landscape has changed, and correctional facilities need modern, proactive screening technologies designed to detect today's most elusive threats—without endangering the people tasked with stopping them.**

## THE COMPLEXITY OF MAIL SCREENING IN CORRECTIONS

In 2025, the challenge of preventing contraband from entering correctional facilities through the mail remains a complex and resource-intensive problem—made even harder by the legal distinctions between personal and legal correspondence. These two mail categories are subject to vastly different handling protocols, creating operational blind spots that are routinely exploited by those seeking to smuggle drugs, electronics, and other prohibited materials into secure environments.

### PERSONAL MAIL: A WIDE-OPEN GATEWAY FOR CONTRABAND

For many incarcerated individuals, personal mail—letters, cards, drawings, photos, books, and magazines—remains their only connection to the outside world. Unfortunately, it also remains one of the easiest and most common channels for smuggling.

Recent 2024 and 2025 seizures confirm the trend:

- Drug-soaked paper and suboxone strips
- Powder and liquid forms of methamphetamine, opioids, heroin, and synthetic cannabinoids
- Concealed electronics such as USB drives, SIM cards, and miniature cell phones
- Other contraband, including sharps, money orders, and weapon components

What's changed in 2025? Criminals are using more sophisticated concealment methods, including chemically treated paper that's indistinguishable from standard stationery—making detection nearly impossible using manual or outdated screening tools.

### LEGAL CORRESPONDENCE: A COMPLIANCE MINEFIELD

Legal mail is constitutionally protected, and its handling is tightly regulated in all 50 states. Documents often cannot be scanned, delayed, or opened without the inmate present, creating a high-risk, high-labor process that further strains limited resources.

A standard legal mail screening process might include:

- Manual inspection for visible fraud indicators (e.g., staining, typos, suspicious formatting)
- Verification via phone calls to the law firm or public defender's office
- Inmate transport to a secure area for supervised opening
- Visual and physical inspection in the inmate's presence

These steps are slow, staff-intensive, and dangerous. Moving inmates for legal mail screening is one of the highest-risk activities for correctional officers. A 2024 Bureau of Justice report noted that over 20% of facility injuries stem from inmate movement and mail inspection activities.


Even with these controls, fraudulent legal mail is on the rise. Smugglers increasingly mimic court notices, hearing transcripts, or attorney communications to bypass standard personal mail restrictions. Attorneys themselves have contributed to the problem. There was a case in late 2024, where a Fort Lauderdale lawyer was charged with smuggling cocaine into a jail using drug-laced sheets disguised as legal documents.

## **ESCALATING SCREENING PROTOCOLS: NECESSARY, BUT NOT ENOUGH**

To combat these challenges, many facilities have adopted stricter policies for both personal and legal mail. These include:

- Limiting letters to a set number of pages
- Accepting only standard-sized envelopes
- Restricting certain ink colors
- Banning photographs, greeting cards, and glossy materials
- Requiring law firms to register for special facility-specific codes (which can still be counterfeited)

Yet even these steps only provide partial protection. Delays, compliance issues, and human error remain common. Worse, these protocols don't address the core problem: today's threats are often undetectable using yesterday's tools.



## THE IDEAL MAIL SCREENING SOLUTION FOR 2025 AND BEYOND

The blueprint for modern mail screening in correctional facilities isn't theoretical, yet exists in a proven digital model: email security.

Every day in 2025, billions of emails are screened for malware, phishing attempts, and other threats. Suspicious messages are flagged and quarantined for further analysis, while safe messages are delivered instantly—without delay, disruption, or risk to the recipient. This automated, layered approach is the gold standard in cybersecurity—and it offers a compelling framework for modernizing physical mail screening.

The same principles should be applied to correctional mailrooms.



### FROM CYBERSECURITY TO PHYSICAL SECURITY: APPLYING A SMARTER MODEL

With advanced 4D T-ray imaging, correctional facilities can now implement an intelligent, layered screening process that mimics email threat detection:

- Screen all incoming mail without opening it
- Immediately route safe items for delivery in their original packaging
- Quarantine suspicious items for further inspection

This non-intrusive workflow enables faster mail handling, protects staff from accidental exposure, and maintains the integrity of legal and personal correspondence.

### BENEFITS OF A MODERN SCREENING APPROACH

A T-ray-enabled screening process offers transformational benefits:

- Maintains privacy and confidentiality, particularly for legal mail
- Protects mail screeners and handlers from direct exposure
- Reduces screening time and backlog across mailrooms
- Improves threat detection, especially for synthetic drugs and small contraband

## T-RAY IMAGING: NEXT-GENERATION SCREENING IS HERE

4D T-ray imaging technology represents a breakthrough in mail security. Unlike X-rays, which are optimized for large, dense objects, T-rays provide safe, real-time, 4D imaging of powders, liquids, soft items, and electronics—even in small quantities and well-concealed formats like drug-laced paper.

This same technology is already in use by:

- 25 State DOCs
- County Jails
- Federal and DHS Detention Facilities
- U.S. Department of Defense
- Fortune 500 executive protection programs
- Federal mail-screening centers
- Global embassies

In 2024, RaySecur's MailSecur® screener earned continued designation under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's SAFETY Act as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (QATT), reinforcing its status as a trusted solution for contraband and CBRNE threat detection in high-security environments.



## MRI-LIKE VISIBILITY, WITHOUT THE RISK

4D T-ray imaging is often compared to ultrasound or MRI—tools that give clear, real-time visibility without harmful radiation. Similarly, T-ray systems are safe to touch, require no special licenses or certifications, and can be set up in minutes using a standard power outlet. Many are fully portable and can be moved between housing units, intake areas, or mailrooms as needed.

Screeners view dynamic 4D images (3D + motion) and can manipulate packages during screening, giving them a natural, intuitive view of each item—without needing to open it.

## COST SAVINGS, SAFETY GAINS, AND OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY

Leading correctional facilities are seeing measurable benefits from T-ray adoption:

- 80% reduction in screening time, freeing up overworked staff
- Fewer inmate transfers, reducing the risk of injury and use-of-force incidents
- Increased detection accuracy, lowering the volume of threats that enter facilities

According to RaySecur's 2025 projections, a 1,000-bed facility can save the equivalent of 0.5 to 1 FTE by eliminating manual mail handling steps. In a staffing crisis, every saved hour counts.

## REDUCING RISK, SAVING LIVES

In addition to operational savings, the real impact is human:

- **\$42,000:** Average cost of a workplace injury claim in corrections
- **\$1.2M:** Average payout for staff death claims
- **\$900,000:** Average settlement for a wrongful inmate death
- **\$2,500–\$20,000:** Cost of overdose treatment per incident

By avoiding unnecessary inmate movement and eliminating exposure to hidden narcotics, T-ray screening reduces these risks dramatically—and gives facilities a powerful story to tell in the event of litigation or media scrutiny.

### Tangible Benefits — Why Facilities Adopt

- **Immediate impact:** MailSecur<sup>®</sup> can be deployed in **under 30 minutes** and integrated directly into existing workflows.
- **Cost efficiency:** For less than the monthly cost of housing a single inmate, facilities can eliminate blind spots that lead to overdoses, lawsuits, and costly staff injuries.
- **Staff safety:** By removing the need for manual handling of suspicious mail, facilities dramatically reduce the likelihood of officer exposure to fentanyl, K2, and other dangerous substances.
- **Contraband reduction:** Real-world deployments have shown **steep declines in drug-soaked mail and related incidents**, allowing correctional staff to redirect time and resources to higher-value tasks.





## CONCLUSION: A SAFER FUTURE STARTS AT THE MAILROOM

In 2025, the threat landscape has evolved—but too many correctional facilities are still relying on outdated manual processes to screen one of the most dangerous entry points: the mail.

4D T-ray imaging is the modern standard. It empowers facilities to detect more threats, reduce operational risk, and protect both staff and inmates—without compromising privacy, compliance, or efficiency.

With growing scrutiny around inmate safety, staff injuries, and contraband-related incidents, correctional leaders need solutions that are proactive, proven, and practical.

**Modernize your mail screening.  
Protect your people.  
Strengthen your facility.**

The technology is here. The time is now. In only 30 minutes, MailSecur<sup>®</sup> is up and running.

## ABOUT RAYSECUR

RaySecur®, the leader in real-time 4D T-ray imaging, revolutionizes concealed threat and contraband detection with MailSecur®. Leading correctional facilities, Global 2000 companies, and government agencies trust RaySecur to keep them safe from hidden threats. MailSecur® is DHS Safety Act Designated and backed by 24/7 expert support by former law enforcement and narcotics officers.

**RAYSECUR®**

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# ATTACHMENT F



NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS  
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**  
**AR 750 – OFFENDER GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MAIL**  
**Effective PENDING**

Description	Page Number
750.01 General Provisions - Offender will be allowed to receive the original, physical copy of Legal and Special mail	2
750.02 Mail Tracking and Record Retention	4
750.03 Outgoing mail, number 1 added.	6
750.03 Outgoing mail (2) Outgoing mail procedure change	6
750.04 Incoming mail, line item 1 added.	7
750.04 Incoming Mail (2) Procedure documenting	7
750.04 Incoming mail (6.G) foreign matter rule addition	8
750.04 Incoming mail (8.B.1.b) Adding polaroids to unauthorized list	9
750.04 Incoming mail (8.B.1.d) foreign matter rule addition	9
750.04 Incoming mail (8.D.4) Special Mail procedure	9
750.04 Incoming mail (7.D.2) Greeting cards rule addition	10
750.04 Incoming mail (8.D.4) foreign matter rule addition	10
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750.09 Ordering Publications (1) addition of “approved” vendors	17

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Other minor changes have been made in formatting for improved clarity and consistency	
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\_\_\_\_\_  
James E. Dzurenda, Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

This summary of changes is for training record purposes only. You must also consult the Administrative Regulation and/or Manual for proper instructions.

I, \_\_\_\_\_, acknowledge receipt of this Summary of Changes and understand it is my responsibility to implement into the course of my duties.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

DRAFT

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NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS  
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION

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**OFFENDER GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MAIL  
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION – 750**

**SUPERSEDES:** AR 750 (06/17/12); and AR 750 (Temporary, 11/25/13), AR 750 (12/17/13)

**EFFECTIVE DATE:** PENDING

**AUTHORITY:** NRS 209.131; NRS 209.365; NRS 209.42303

**RESPONSIBILITY**

The Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC and Department) is responsible for the implementation of this Administrative Regulation (AR).

The Wardens will ensure that their appropriate assigned subordinate supervisors have read and understand this regulation.

The Associate Wardens will ensure that their appropriate assigned subordinate supervisors have read and understand this regulation.

Supervisors will ensure that their appropriate subordinate staff members have read and understand this regulation.

Designated staff members will know, comply with, and enforce this regulation.

If, and where applicable, offenders will know and comply with this regulation.

~~All offenders are responsible to comply with mail and correspondence procedures. All correspondents are responsible for the contents of and compliance with procedures applicable to mail items sent into a Department institution or facility.~~

~~Designated mailroom staff at each facility/institution are responsible to ensure mail is processed in a correct manner.~~

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~~An Associate Warden or Facility Manager has supervisory responsibility over daily mailroom operations.~~

## 750.01 GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. ~~All offenders will receive the original, physical copies of Legal and Special mail. All mail will be processed in accordance with current State and OSHA biohazard guidelines and procedures. All mail shall be processed pursuant to current State and OSHA biohazard guidelines and procedures.~~

1.—

- A. Each institution/facility will designate a secure mailroom location.
- B. The mailroom:
  - 1) Should be open eight (8) hours per day;
  - 2) Should be open five (5) days per week; and,
  - 3) Will be closed on holidays and weekends.
- C. All institutions/facilities will designate a secure area(s) and/or secure mailboxes for outgoing offender mail:
  - 1) Mail will only be collected by staff.
  - 2) Mail will be collected at least once every day except weekends and holidays.
  - 3) A set schedule of regular mail collection will be established.
- D. No personal delivery of offender mail or correspondence will be authorized except when legal requirements require delivery to be made in person. Staff will not pick up or deliver such items.
- E. Each institution will include the requirements of this Administrative Regulation in its orientation program.
- F. There are no limits on the number of letters an offender may send or receive, except as specifically authorized by this regulation.
- G. Change of address/forwarding mail:
  - 1) When an offender transfers to another institution or facility, in accordance with Administrative Regulation 722, first-class general correspondence

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and privileged correspondence will be forwarded via the US Postal Service. Second- and Third-Class mail will be forwarded via intra-departmental mail.

- 2) When an offender is released, first class mail addressed to the offender will be forwarded to the forwarding address provided for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of release.
  - a) If no forwarding address is provided, the first-class mail item will be returned to sender.
  - b) Discharged and paroling offenders or offenders being transferred to another agency/state jurisdiction are responsible for notifying the mailroom staff and correspondents of a forwarding address.
  - c) Only first-class mail items will be forwarded; all other items, including publications, will be returned to sender.

#### H. Policy Intent

- 1) This change eliminates physical processing of general correspondence at NDOC institutions.
- 2) Only Legal Mail and Special Mail will be handled or inspected on-site.
- 3) All other mail will be processed off-site through the Department's approved digital mail vendor, ensuring compliance, security, and efficiency while reducing contraband introduction.

#### I. Holding mail

- 1) For offenders who are temporarily confined in local hospitals or jails and expected to return to the institution/facility from which they departed, first-class mail should be held no longer than one working day.
- 2) For such temporary confinement, expected to last longer than one (1) day, where the hospital or jail is an "out-of-town" facility, first-class mail should be forwarded to the offender care of the hospital or jail.
- 3) For such temporary confinement longer than one day to a hospital or facility "in-town" staff may deliver first-class mail to the offender at the in-town facility.
- 4) All other items of mail, including publications, will be held until the offender's return.

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J. Care regarding distribution of mail:

- 1) Offenders will not pick up or deliver mail.
- 2) No mail will be left on tables or in other unattended areas where offenders have access.

**750.02 MAIL TRACKING AND RECORD RETENTION**

1. Records that will be maintained by staff and that may be kept electronically. The designated Mailroom Supervisor or designee shall maintain a digital record of all Legal and Special Mail processed through the facility.:
2. A log shall be kept of all incoming or outgoing registered, insured, special or certified mail using, Form DOC- 3088:
  - A. The record shall be maintained using the approved Excel Mail Log Tracker, documenting dates, offender names, sender information, and disposition as applicable. Upon completion each month, the Excel Mail Log shall be converted to a PDF format and stored in the facility's Mailroom Shared Drive for permanent record retention and administrative review. This digital record will serve as the official verification of mail activity and may be reviewed by administration, investigators, or audit teams as needed.
  - A.B. A log shall be kept of all unauthorized mail using Form DOC- 3086-Revised;
  - B.C. A log shall be kept of all offender-to-offender approved correspondence using Form DOC- 3087-Revised;
  - C.D. A log shall be kept of all rejected mail using Form DOC- 1740-Revised; and
  - D.E. A log shall be kept of all mail that is monitored using Form DOC- 3022
3. Violations of rules or policies, governing mail procedures, may result in the suspension or termination of correspondence between the parties involved.
4. Refer to the Department's Administrative Regulation 722, for specific procedures for managing offender privileged correspondence.
5. Refer to Administrative Regulation 711, for package procedures.
6. Offenders may correspond in their primary language.

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7. Prohibited Mail:

- A. Each facility will establish a process for review of questionable items of mail received.
- B. Mail items that contain matter detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or facility, or that facilitate criminal activity, are prohibited, including but not limited to:
- 1) Content that depicts or describes procedures for the construction or use of weapons, ammunition, bombs, or incendiary devices;
  - 2) Content that depicts, encourages, or describes methods of escape from correctional facilities, or contains blueprints, drawings, or similar descriptions of prison institutions;
  - 3) Content that depicts or describes procedures for the brewing of alcoholic beverages, or the manufacture of drugs or unlawful substances;
  - 4) Content that is written in code;
  - 5) Content that describes or encourages activities which may lead to the use of violence or promotes hate groups or gang activities;
  - 6) Content that encourages or instructs in the commission of criminal activity or depicts criminal activity;
  - 7) Content that displays realistic pictures of guns or knives, or that is suitable for use in making of facsimiles weapons;
  - 8) Content that is sexually explicit, which by its nature poses a threat to the security good order, rehabilitation or discipline of the institution, or facilitates criminal activity;
  - 9) Content that includes instruction relating to tattooing;
  - 10) Content that advocates terrorism, racial, religious, or national origin hatred, or that creates an unsafe environment for offenders or prison staff;
  - 11) Content that provides instructions for military, police or security tactics for riots, hostage negotiation, or any Homeland Security drills;
  - 12) Content related to survival guide information ;
  - 13) Content or mail that ~~has or~~ contains any foreign matter, previously wet, narcotic or intoxicant substances.

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- C. Mail items related to business operations, except mail items as necessary to protect property interest that vested before incarceration that have been approved by the Warden/designee.
  - D. Mail items containing solicitations or receipt of advertisements including publications not paid for in advance or not coming directly from a verifiable known publisher or vendor.
  - E. Publications, the purchase of which is contingent on future purchases or orders, such as book of the month clubs, etc.

### 750.032 OUTGOING MAIL

- 1. All outgoing mail is subject to be scanned by using T-Ray technology and 3D video imaging to screen for and detect contraband on or within mail items. If contraband is detected, the mail item will be rejected.
- 2. All outgoing mail must be unsealed for inspection, unless processed as legal mail. Legal mail must be inspected prior to sealing the item and signed by authorized correctional staff. Sealed items will be rejected and returned to the offender.
- 3. All envelopes must be properly addressed and:
  - A. Be stamped on the back with the name of the institution/facility from which it is being sent and the date of mailing; and
  - B. Have the offender's name, identification number, institution/facility name and mailing address in the return address portion of the envelope.
- 4. All outgoing mail must be sent via U.S. Postal Service and requires the appropriate postage.
- 5. Correspondence addressed to Department officials and staff may be routed through the interdepartmental mail services.
- 6. The Warden/designee may prohibit outgoing mail under appropriate circumstances which include, but are not limited to:
  - A. Correspondence with minors whose legal guardians have objected, in writing, stating their wish that such correspondence to be prohibited;
  - B. Correspondence with individuals who have objected in writing to lewd, threatening, or offensive correspondence;

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- C. Correspondence prohibited by court order, such as a Judgment of Conviction (JOC) prohibiting contact with the victim(s).

~~5.7.~~ An offender should receive written notice when correspondence has been prohibited.

~~8.~~ Attempt to engage in prohibited correspondence will result in disciplinary action.

~~6.9.~~ Indigent Offender Postage:

- A. Indigent offenders will be provided postage for a maximum of two personal letters per week.
- B. The mailroom staff will write the agency's budget account number in the area of the envelope where the stamp would normally be placed and send the mail item to the State Mailroom for processing, except remote institutions/facilities without access to State Mailrooms will purchase stamps for this purpose.

~~7.10.~~ "Indigent-at-the-moment" Offender Postage:

- A. Offenders whose accounts are not accessible to them, i.e., frozen for longer than 30 days, will be considered to be "indigent-at-the-moment offenders."
- B. "Indigent-at-the-moment" offenders are not eligible for free personal letters and must submit a brass slip with their correspondence for mailing.

#### **750.043 INCOMING MAIL**

1. All incoming mail is subject to be scanned by using T-Ray technology and 3D video imaging to screen for and detect contraband on or within mail items. If contraband is detected, the mail item will be rejected. Or Mail that is electronically scanned shall not be allowed when foreign substances and items are clearly detected. If items are detected, but not clear, the mail may be opened, and a determination will be made. If suspicious or objectionable content is found, mailroom staff shall notify the appropriate designated Associate Warden for review and possible rejection. If no objectionable content is present, authorized staff shall cause the mail to be processed for delivery to the offender.

~~4.2.~~ General Correspondence

- A. All incoming general correspondence will be received, processed, and delivered electronically through the Department's approved digital mail vendor.
- B. Mailroom staff will not handle, open, inspect, or distribute any physical general correspondence.

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- C. Original paper copies of general correspondence will not enter the institution and will not be retained by NDOC.
  - D. Offenders will receive their general mail exclusively through their assigned tablet device or other approved digital platform.

3. All deliverable incoming mail (except legal mail) will be opened and inspected prior to entering the facility.

2.4. All incoming mail, including mail marked "Return to Sender," will be opened for the inspection for contraband, unauthorized items, cash, coin, checks, and money orders, and scanned by mailroom staff. Disposal of unauthorized items will be pursuant to section 750.7 of this regulation.

3.5. Offenders are not allowed to receive, from any source, confidential information, which includes but is not limited to personal information about:

- A. Current or past offenders;
- B. Any other person without that person's knowledge and written consent.

4.6. Envelopes containing incoming mail:

- A. All envelopes received as incoming mail must be addressed to the offender in the name under which they were committed. If an offender has obtained a legal name change, the envelope must contain both names.
- B. The offender's name should be properly spelled.
- C. The offender's identification number must be noted.
- D. The sender's name and address must appear in the upper left corner.
- E. Reasonable efforts will be made to deliver the item if the offender's name is correct, but the identification number is wrong or missing.

F. If the offender's name is misspelled and the identification number is incorrect or missing the mail will be returned unopened to sender.

G. Shall be free of stickers, glitter, bodily fluids, lipstick, wax, or any unknown foreign substance. Physical mail containing adhesives, glitter, tape, labels, stickers, perfume, wax, or any other prohibited materials will not be accepted.

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~~F.H.~~ Any general mail sent directly to the institution will be rejected and returned to sender with instructions to use the Department's approved digital mail system.

~~5.7.~~ Mail is sorted before opening to ascertain if the offender is in the Department.

~~6.8.~~ Allowed enclosures in first-class mail are limited to:

A. Enclosures per envelope, not exceeding 10 pages, excluding the letter of one article or advertisement such as from a newspaper or magazine or printouts from website, or one pamphlet.

B. Personal photographs:

1) A maximum of ten per envelope not including pictures in an enclosed article or advertisement.

a) Shall not exceed 8" x 10" in size.

b) No instant photos or "Polaroids"

~~If computer generated on paper no larger than standard 8 1/2" x 11", which may contain up to 10 photographs on one page, but each photograph counts as one of the ten maximum allowed.~~

c) All must have the offender's name and NDOC ~~back~~ identification number on the back.

d) Shall be free of stickers, glitter, bodily fluids, lipstick, wax, or any unknown foreign substance.

2) Photographs of nude persons:

a) Shall not depict sexual activity.

b) Shall have the offender's name and NDOC identification number on back of each photo, and;

c) Shall not be displayed or traded.

C. Religious material is limited to one piece or item of religious material per envelope.

D. Special Mail~~Greeting cards:~~

1) Special Mail will be handled in a secure and consistent manner, ensuring the integrity of the mail scanning system and safe operation of the facility

~~2) No musical, "Pop-up" 3 dimensional, or electronic type cards are allowed.~~

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- 3)2) To establish standards for greeting cards and pictures for special events, including birthdays, encouragement, condolences, and anniversaries.
- 4)3) Special Mail refers to personal correspondence sent to offenders that is not digitally scanned to the offender tablet system but will be physically delivered to the offender after thorough inspection. This category of mail is subject to the same approval and handling procedures as general correspondence with specific restrictions on the materials used.
- 4) Special Mail will be treated in accordance with the institution's general correspondence policy with the exceptions and clarifications contained in this procedure.
- a) All Special Mail will be opened and inspected by designated mailroom staff in accordance with institutional security procedures.
  - b) Permitted writing instruments:
    - i. Colored ink pens and pencils (subject to inspection)
    - ii. Crayons
    - iii. Printer ink
    - iv. Water based markers
  - c) Prohibited material
    - i. Gel pens
    - ii. Glitter
    - iii. Glue
    - iv. Paint (including watercolor, acrylic, oil, etc.)
    - v. Stickers, or any adhesive materials
    - vi. Any other substances or embellishments that may interfere with mail scanning equipment or be classified as contraband

d) Any mail containing prohibited materials will be rejected and returned to sender with an explanation or handled according to contraband policy.

5) Special Mail Enforcement

e)a) Violations of this policy by offenders may result in disciplinary action in accordance with institutional rules and regulations.

d)b) Offenders will be required to submit a Special Mail Request form (DOC XXX) in advance of receiving Special Mail.

c) Repeated non-compliance by outside correspondents may result in mail restrictions.

~~1)~~

2) Limit of one card per envelope; and

~~Size no~~ Shall not be larger than 8" x 10" in size when open.

Shall be free of stickers, glitter, bodily fluids, lipstick, wax, or any unknown foreign substance.

~~4)6)~~ Legal and Special Mail Exceptions

a) Only Legal Mail and Special Mail are authorized for physical inspection and delivery within the institution.

b) Legal Mail will continue to be processed in accordance with Administrative Regulation 722.

c) Special Mail will be processed in accordance with Operational Procedure XXX (Offender Special Mail), including all approval, inspection, and stamping requirements.

d) All other categories of mail must be submitted and processed through the Department's digital mail system.

E. Calendars:

1) May contain no spiral bindings or metal parts:

2) Must not exceed maximum size of approximately ~~11" x 18"~~ 12 1/2" x 18 1/2" opened.

3) May not contain depiction of nude persons or sexual activity if being displayed; and

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4) Must be from a verifiable publisher or vendor in a factory sealed wrapper.

F. Personal identification items such as birth certificates, social security documents, marriage documents and military documents will be forwarded to the offender's caseworker for delivery.

G. Electronic Mail Service:

1) Electronic mail service, consisting of a one-way communication from a correspondent to an offender is available. Only authorized staff ~~who have an active password~~ may process electronic mail. Once electronic mail is opened, authorized staff shall ~~inspect~~view the mail for unauthorized content. If suspicious or objectionable content is found, mailroom staff shall print the letter electronic mail and forward it to the appropriate designated Associate Warden for review and possible rejection. If no objectionable content is present, authorized staff shall cause the printed letter electronic mail to be delivered to the offender via the offender's unit mail bag. Electronic mail containing unauthorized content will be rejected pursuant to Administrative Regulation 750.01 (sub-section O), 750.03 (sub-section 4), 750.03 (sub-section 7-B-2-A.

H. Publications and Packages:

1) May contain no spiral bindings or metal.

2) The institution/facility will review all publications for suspicious or objectionable content. If such is found, the publication shall be forwarded to the Publication Review Committee for appropriate disposition.

3) No publication will be rejected solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social, or sexual or because its content is unpopular, repugnant, or does not agree with commonly held beliefs and practices.

4) -Publications, books, and approved materials must continue to follow AR 711 (Offender Property) and AR 750.08 (Ordering Publications).

5) These items are not part of the digital mail process and must come directly from verified vendors or publishers.

I. Publication Review Committee:

1) Each Institution/Facility will establish a Publication Review Committee to review all publications that the mail room staff have a reason to believe

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may contain objectionable content, prior to the initial rejection of the publication following the above guidelines.

- 2) The Committee has a minimum of three (3) members; one of whom shall be appointed by the Warden or Facility Manager, one of whom shall be an Associate Warden or Facility Supervisor, or above.
- 3) The Committee shall convene within seven days from when a publication is referred by the mail room staff.

#### **750.04-05 OTHER MAIL/CORRESPONDENCE**

##### 1. Correspondence between incarcerated persons:

- A. Correspondence between all incarcerated persons is limited to correspondence between immediate family members.
- B. Legal correspondence between NDOC incarcerated persons is allowed if they are co-defendants or co-plaintiffs in active post-conviction litigation or pursuant to a court order.
- C. Common law relationships are not considered immediate family for purposes of correspondence between incarcerated persons.
- D. To engage in allowed correspondence with an offender in another institution, the offender must obtain a correspondence request form from their caseworker, complete it, and return it to their caseworker, who will forward it to the Warden.
  - 1) The approval of the Wardens of both institutions is required.
  - 2) If the Warden at the initiating offender's institution approves the request, they shall indicate this on the form and forward the form to the Warden of the receiving institution.
  - 3) If the Wardens of both institutions approve the correspondence, the original will be placed in the initiating offender's I-File, a copy will be placed in the receiving offender's I-File, and a copy will be maintained in the permanent record of offender correspondence approved in the mailroom of each institution.
  - 4) Once full approval is obtained, no further approval is necessary even if the offender is transferred.
  - 5) If the Warden of either institution disapproves the correspondence, the Warden disapproving the request shall state the reasons for the disapproval in writing on the request form.

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- 6) Approved offender-to-offender correspondence shall be via US Postal Service, postage paid.
  2. Social Security Benefits. All social security or supplemental security checks mailed to offenders will be returned to the Social Security Administration address indicated on the sending envelope regardless of the geographic location of the institution or facility.
  3. IRS Checks. All IRS checks received will be forwarded to a designated person in Offender Services. Offender Services will contact IRS for approval before depositing IRS checks to the offender's account.
  4. Mail addressed to any program, Prison Industries/Silver State Industries, Education, Chaplain, or other programs at an institution or facility will be given to the staff supervisor of that program. Regardless of how the mail is addressed, the supervisor will open all such mail. Offenders shall not open any mail not specifically addressed to them.

#### **750.05-06 MONITORING OFFENDER MAIL**

1. Incoming and/or outgoing mail items are monitored by designated staff upon reasonable suspicion that the item contains restricted matter.
2. All requests for monitoring must be submitted in writing to the Warden/designee for prior approval and state in detail:
  - A. The reason for monitoring; and
  - B. The approximate length, if known, or as estimated, that the monitoring is expected to last.
  - C. Upon a showing of sufficient exigency, the Warden may verbally authorize temporary monitoring until the full detailed written request is submitted, which shall be submitted without unreasonable delay.
3. Mail Monitoring Log. A log of all mail monitoring activity shall be maintained in the designated mailroom by the Mailroom staff, using Form DOC-3022 which shall include the following:
  - A. Offender's full name and NDOC identification number;
  - B. Name of NDOC official who authorized the monitoring;
  - C. Dates monitoring started and ended; and
  - D. Name(s) or designation of staff authorized to conduct the monitoring activity.
4. Delivery of monitored mail shall not be delayed for more than 24 hours.

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- A. Monitored mail may be copied.
  - B. If a delay in delivery of monitored mail exceeds 24 hours, the procedures for rejected mail items must be followed.
5. Offender-to-offender mail. Allowed, approved mail between NDOC incarcerated offenders may be monitored without prior approval.
  6. Monitoring of privileged correspondence is not allowed. If reasonable suspicion exists that privileged correspondence contains contraband or prohibited content, the procedures shall be described in the Department's Administrative Regulation 722 applicable to legal mail shall apply.

#### **750.06-07 OFFENDER GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MAIL REJECTION PROCESS**

1. Notice to Offender. If any item of mail addressed to an offender is rejected for any reason the offender shall receive written notice that describes the rejected item, states the reason it was rejected, notifies the offender of their right to appeal through the grievance process in accordance with Administrative Regulation 740, and notifies the sender of their right to appeal by sending an appeal within 20 calendar days of the date of the notice of rejection addressed to the Warden of the institution or Manager of the facility stating the objections to the rejection. The sender's appeal shall be reviewed and responded to by a designated Associate Warden not involved in the decision to reject the mail item, whose decision shall be final.
2. Notice to Sender. Where an item of mail addressed to an offender is rejected for any reason, a copy of the written notice given to the offender shall be given to the sender, unless the sender is an NDOC incarcerated offender and the correspondence was not authorized and properly approved, which notice shall contain the procedure for appeal of the rejection by the sender.
3. The mailroom shall maintain a log of rejected mail items using Mail Log Form DOC 1740.

#### **750.07-08 DISPOSAL OF REJECTED MAIL ITEMS RECEIVED**

1. Upon receipt of notice of rejection of an item of mail, if the offender does not choose to grieve the rejection pursuant to AR 740, the offender has ten (10) days from the date of receipt of said notice to inform the mailroom staff in writing how the offender chooses to dispose of the rejected item, either by returning it to sender, sending it to a third person at the offender's expense, or destroying it.
2. If the offender uses the grievance process to appeal the rejection of the mail item, or if the sender appeals the rejection;

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- A. The Grievance Coordinator shall notify the mailroom upon receipt of the grievance, and/or the Warden's office shall notify the mailroom upon receipt of the sender's appeal.
  - B. The mailroom should ~~return~~hold the rejected item until the grievance process or the appeal process is completed.
  - C. Upon completion of the grievance process, the Grievance Coordinator will notify the mailroom of the outcome of the grievance.
  - D. If the grievance is denied the offender shall have ten (10) days from the date their appeal is final to notify the mailroom staff how to dispose of the rejected item.
  - E. The mailroom staff will await the decision on the sender's appeal before disposing of the rejected mail item.
  - F. If either the offender's grievance is upheld or the sender's appeal is upheld, the formerly rejected item will be promptly delivered to the offender.
  - G. In both instances, the disposition will be noted on an Unauthorized Mail Form, DOC 3086, that shall be filed in the offender's I-File.
3. All items disposed of by sending to the third persons will be at the offender's expense.
    - A. Items valued at \$10.00 or more will be sent certified mail.
    - B. If the offender is indigent at the moment, a brass slip will be submitted by the offender.
    - C. If the offender does not wish to send items out, they will be disposed of per this procedure.
  4. Any money, stamps, or other negotiable instruments not delivered to the offender will be sent to the Administrative Services Officer (ASO)/designee who will forward the items to Offender Services for placement in the Offender Welfare Fund (OFW) with a receipt obtained and attached to the DOC Form 1518, Unauthorized Mail Notification.
  5. In disposing of any contraband discovered (narcotics, etc.) the Department's Administrative Regulation 458 will be followed.
  6. When the Mailroom staff disposes of an item, a staff witness is required. The date/time disposal, how it was disposed of, and reason for destruction (cite the AR) should be noted on the Unauthorized Mail Notification, Form DOC-1518.

**Note:** Usually, all items will be shredded or donated to a local charity.

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7. A copy of the Unauthorized Mail Notification Form will be placed in the I-File.

#### **750.08-09 ORDERING PUBLICATIONS**

1. All offenders are allowed to order and receive publications directly from approved, verified publishers and vendors.
  - A. Books contents must comply with limitations set forth in this regulation. See General Provisions Section O.
2. Books must be paperback only.
  - A. Upon receipt, all books will be subject to review by the mailroom staff and must comply with this regulation for content by the Publication Review Committee.
  - B. All books identified as not complying with procedures will be sent to the Publication Review Committee.
3. The number of books in an offender's possession will comply with the Department's Administrative Regulation 711, Offender Personal Property procedure, and institutional operating procedures.
4. Prior to the publication being issued to the offender, the mailroom staff shall place the offender's name and offender number on the inside front cover of the publication.

#### **750.09-10 CORRESPONDENCE COURSES/CLASSES**

1. Correspondence courses may be ordered and received by offenders.
2. Correspondence courses must be prepaid.
3. These courses are self-edification/self-help only and are not recognized by NDOC's Educational Program Division.
4. These courses are not eligible for merit credits unless otherwise approved by the Director.
5. CDs and written materials are allowed and must be in compliance with AR 711.

#### **APPLICABILITY**

1. This regulation requires Operating Procedures for each institution and facility.
2. This regulation requires an audit.

**REFERENCES:** ACA Standards 5<sup>th</sup> Edition 5-ACI-7D-01 - 09

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James E. Dzurenda, Director

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Date

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